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PROCEDURAL UNCERTAINTY IN
MARKMAN HEARINGS: WHEN WILL THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT SHOW THE WAY
TIMOTHY M. SALMON*
I. INTRODUCTION
The grant of a patent confers upon the patentee the right to
exclude others from making, using or selling that which is the
subject matter of that patent.' However, the inventor's right to
exclude is limited by the scope of the claims in the patent.2 Thus,
in prosecuting patent applications, inventors try to employ broad
claim language that will give them the most protection against
potential infringers. 3 The claim language, however, is usually
* J.D. Candidate, St. John's University School of Law, June 2004; B.S. Biomedical
Engineering, University of Rochester, May 2001.
1 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries."); see also Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376
U.S. 225, 229 (1964) (stating that a patent grant is that of a statutory monopoly); RONALD
B. HILDRETH, PATENT LAW - A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 8 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing the
constitutional source and economic nature of patent law).
2 See Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29-30 (1997). The
Supreme Court held that each element of a claim is material to defining its scope. Id. The
Court in Warner Jenkinson also affirmed the concept that the Court is without authority
to broaden the rights conferred by grant of a patent beyond the scope of its claims. Id. In
constructing patent law, Congress sought to achieve the dual purpose of providing
inventors with sufficient incentive to create while allowing the public to make use of and
improve upon inventions. See generally Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in
Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1045, 1046 (2001). However, others argue that
granting narrowly defined patents fosters competition and advancement in the patent
market. Jay Kesan & Marc Banik, Administrative Law Issues: Patents as Incomplete
Contracts: Aligning Incentives for R&D Investment with Incentives to Disclose Prior Art, 2
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 23, 24 (2000).
3 See Paul M. Janicke, When Patents are Broadened Midstream: A Compromise
Solution to Protect Competitors and Existing Users, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 10-11 (1997)
(stating that the inventor, advised by his patent attorney, initially tries to employ broad
language designed to cover an infinite number of possibilities); Michael J. Mauriel, Patent
Reexamination's Problem: The Power to Amend, 46 DUKE L.J. 135, 140 (1996) (noting that
patent applications are drafted with broad patent language which is narrowed in response
to Patent and Trademark Office rejections).
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narrowed during the prosecution process to avoid rejections
based on prior art.4 If a patent issues based on the narrowed
claim language, the right to exclude will necessarily be
restricted. 5 In an infringement action, the patent owner will be
limited to enforcing the claim language as narrowed in the issued
patent, not the broad language that began the application
process. 6 Hence, the terms used in drafting and amending the
claims must be carefully chosen, because the language will be
subject to interpretation in infringement litigation. 7
The issue of claim construction was definitively decided by the
Supreme Court in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.8 In
Markman, the Supreme Court held that the interpretation of
4 See Mauriel, supra note 3, at 140-41 (describing the patent prosecution process with
regard to narrowing of claim language to overcome rejections based on prior art); see also
Jay I. Alexander, Cabining the Doctrine of Equivalents in Festo: A Historical Perspective
on the Relationship Between the Doctrines of Equivalents and Prosecution History
Estoppel, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 583 (2002) (discussing the Supreme Court's ruling in
Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp. that patent language amended to avoid further
rejection based on prior art was to be strictly construed); John Romary & Arie
Michelsohn, Patent Claim Interpretation After Markmar How the Federal Circuit
Interprets Claims, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 1887, 1892-95 (1997) (discussing the process of
narrowing a patent claim and noting that claim language is often narrowed to avoid
ambiguity).
5 See Wang Lab v. Mitsubishi Elecs. Am., 103 F.3d 1571, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting
that a narrowed claim will have a better chance of allowance but restricts the applicant's
rights); see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki, 535 U.S. 722, 741
(2002) (stating that claim language narrowed during patent prosecution triggered
prosecution history estoppel and that the patentee had the burden of proving that the
amendment was not made for a purpose that would give rise to such estoppel). But see
Laura A. Handley, Refining the Graver Tank Analysis with Hypothetical Claims: A
Biotechnology Exemplar, 5 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 31, 33 (1991) (explaining that when a
patent is inadequate to protect the author's intent due to narrow language, courts often
interpret the language broadly for purposes of equity).
6 See Festo Corp., 535 U.S. at 722 (holding that prosecution history estoppel arose
when amendments were made to secure a patent and it narrowed the patent's scope);
Alexander, supra note 4, at 583-84 (stating that settled law prevented the doctrine of
equivalents from "recapturing claims which the patentee has surrendered by
amendment"). See generally Romary & Michelsohn, supra note 4, at 1888-90 (noting that
the quality of drafting for the patent language is the source of protection against later
infringers).
7 See Kenneth Muhammad, An Analysis of Patent Claim Construction for Newly
Invented Monoclonal Anti-bodies, Johns Hopkins University v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d
1342 (Fed Cir. 1998), 18 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 95, 108 (1999) (remarking that
choice of claim language is of utmost importance in the prosecution process). See generally
Janicke, supra note 3, at 10-17 (discussing the balance of constructing patent language
narrow enough to avoid prior art and broad enough to ensure that subsequent inventors
cannot easily design around it); Romary & Michelsohn, supra note 4, at 1888-89 (noting
that a while the patentee needs to identify the invention in its best mode, he may be
permitted to add many more embodiments in order to preclude a wider range of potential
infringers).
8 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (affirming the federal circuit's ruling that claim construction is
within the authority of the court rather than the jury).
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patent claims, including terms of art used therein, is a question
of law to be decided by the court, not one of fact reserved for the
jury.9 The decision was based on the concept that patents are
legal documents similar to contracts, which have traditionally
been interpreted by the court.10 Guided by that rationale, the
Supreme Court felt that judges were better suited to construe
claim language, because they have been trained to interpret legal
documents.11 Finally, the Court felt that its holding in Markman
would foster intrajurisdictional uniformity in patent
infringement suits.12
9 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 372 (noting that certiorari was granted to determine the
Seventh Amendment claim of right to a jury trial on all issues of fact, claim construction
allegedly being an issue of fact); William Lee & Anita Krug, Still Adjusting to Markman:
A Prescription for the Timing of Claim Construction Hearings, 13 HARv. J.L. & TECH 55,
56 (1999) (discussing the Supreme Court's reasoning in ruling that claim construction is
an issue to be decided by judges rather than jury); see also John F. Duffy, Administrative
Law Issues: On Improving the Legal Process of Claim Interpretation: Administrative
Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 109, 117-19 (2000) (stating that the Supreme
Court's ruling in Markman provided a clear message that juries are not to be involved in
claim interpretation).
10 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 387 (explaining that "[q]uestions of construction are
questions of law for the judge, not questions of fact for the jury."); John Lane & Christine
Pepe, Living Before, Through, and With Markman: Claim Construction as a Matter of
Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 59, 62 (2001) (noting that the Supreme Court's decision
to affirm the Federal Circuit was unanimous);.see also Duffy, supra note 9, at 117 (stating
that the Court in Markman determined that the jury's competence in determining
credibility was outweighed by the judges expertise and relative competence in textual
interpretation of legal documents).
11 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 388 (stating "[tihe construction of written instruments is
one of those things that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors"); see also
Duffy, supra note 9, at 117 (explaining that the Supreme Court in Markman determined
that judges are more properly suited to interpret legal documents and to find and
determine the meaning of patent terms); Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 57-58 (noting that
the Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit's rationale that a patent, as a written
document, is exclusively in the province of the court and is to be determined as a matter
of law).
12 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 390-91. At the end of his opinion in Markman, Justice
Souter recalled that the time-limited monopoly that is granted to inventors is meant to
encourage invention. Id. The promotion of invention through the grant of temporary
monopolistic rights would ultimately benefit the public by "foster[ing] technological
growth and industrial innovation." Id. at 390 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-312 (1981)). See
also Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explosion,"
"Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 1111-12 (2003). Professor Miller noted that
uniformity in patent treatment and the promotion of intrajurisdictional certainty were
distinct goals of the Court's ruling in Markman. Id at 1111-12. The Court reasoned that
judges were better suited as the interpreters of patent claims. See Joan E. Schaffner, The
Seventh Amendment Right to Civil Jury Trial: The Supreme Court Giveth and the
Supreme Court Taketh Away, 31 U. BALT. L. REV. 225, 244 (2002). As opposed to juries,
the Court expected that judges were more likely to foster uniformity in review and
precedent in the construction of patent documents. Id at 244.
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The holding in Markman inspired the creation of the
'MVarkman hearing," a judicial proceeding dedicated solely to
claim construction.13 However, with the creation of this new
proceeding came many issues that were not commented on, nor
decided in Markman.14 One of the main ramifications of the
Markman decision was that claim construction, now done as a
matter of law by trial courts, would be reviewed de novo by the
Federal Circuit on appeal.15 The de novo standard of review had
the potential to promote an increase in the number of reversals. 16
Courts and legal commentators have taken notice of the
significant reversal rate of Markman orders by the Federal
13 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 1008 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1995)
(en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the interpretation of claims by the
court may require a 'mini-trial' dedicated solely to that purpose); see also Lane & Pepe,
supra note 10, at 63-64 (discussing the development, by district courts, of independent
proceedings employed to determine claim construction known as Markman hearings);
Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15
HARV. J.L. & TECH 1, 7 (2001) (explaining that district court judges lacking in scientific
and technological expertise can develop an enhanced understanding of the issues through
the introduction of evidence and argument during Markman hearings).
14 See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1475 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader,
J., dissenting) (listing eight problems that have been created by the Federal Circuit's
ruling in Markman); Markman, 52 F.3d at 999 (Newman, J., dissenting) (stating "[tihe
jury is eliminated, and new and uncertain procedures are imposed on trial judges."); see
also Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 60-61 (arguing that "the timing and procedures that
judges are to follow in interpreting claims are far from settled, and courts' practices in
interpreting claim language have varied wildly.").
15 See Markman, 52 F.3d at 999-1000 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman
opined that the complex subject matter of patent infringement suits is not suited to a fact-
finding process conducted under constraints of the appellate procedure. Id. Judge
Newman also asserted doubts about the technological accuracy of appellate court fact-
finding when the trial court's decision has been made after a full trial. Id. at 1005. See
also Jay Kesan & Thomas Ulen, Intellectual Property Challenges in the Next Century,
2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 65-66 (2001). Despite the Supreme Court's intent in Markman to
ensure greater uniformity and certainty in patent litigation, the author notes Professor
Craig Nard's contention that the Federal Circuit must begin to accept interlocutory
appeals in order to ensure such goals. Id at 65-66. Nard argues that the refusal to accept
interlocutory appeals only fosters inefficiency and a lack of uniformity and certainty. Id at
66; see also Moore, supra note 13, at 8. Moore notes that the Supreme Court decision in
Markman assigns the duty of claim construction to the judges. The Federal Circuit held
that such claim construction, as a matter of law, is subject to de novo review on appeal.
Id.
16 See John W. Shaw, Markman Hearings - When is the Best Time? (July 31, 2002)
(observing that studies have shown that the Federal Circuit reverses one-third of all
appeals involving claim construction issues), at http://www.ycst.com/PDF
/jshaw-markman.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2004); see also Moore, supra note 13, at 14
(noting that the Federal Circuit disagrees with one in every three claim constructions by
the district courts, leading to many reversals and much uncertainty in this area of patent
law); Arti K. Rai, Patent System Reform: Specialized Trial Courts: Concentrating
Expertise on Fact, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 877, 884 (2002) (commenting that two recent
empirical studies indicate that the Federal Circuit, on appeal, has disagreed with the
lower court on the issue of claim construction in at least one-third of cases).
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Circuit.17 One study done in 1997 reported that the Federal
Circuit reversed 38.3% of cases involving claim construction. 18
Relatively little guidance was offered as to the extent extrinsic
evidence (i.e. expert testimony, dictionaries, technological
treatises) should be used by the trial court when construing the
language of patent claims.19 Though the evidentiary debate was
a prevalent issue soon after Markman, the controversy
surrounding it has subsided after the Federal Circuit's holding in
Vitrionics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc. 20 In Vitrionics, the Federal
Circuit held, "only if there were still some genuine ambiguity in
the claims, after consideration of the all available intrinsic
evidence, should the trial court have resorted to extrinsic
evidence."21 In subsequent decisions, the Federal Circuit has
given trial court judges flexibility in using extrinsic evidence to
provide assistance for background technical knowledge.22
17 See Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Directing Traffix: A Comment on the Construction and
Application of Utility Patent Claims in Trade Litigation, 54 FLA. L. REV. 229, 283-84
(2002) (emphasizing that the increased level of appellate scrutiny employed by the
Federal Circuit in characterizing claim construction has led to a reversal rate of near 40%
at certain times); Lane & Pepe, supra note 10, at 72 (remarking that in one case the
Federal Circuit reversed its own prior claim construction of the same claim language);
Moore, supra note 13, at 14-17 (concluding that, possibly in part to the less deferential
standard of review accorded to claim construction, the reversal rate for claim construction
is higher than that of any other patent issue).
18 See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1476 n.16 (citing study done by Federal Circuit of
cases with claim construction issues arising out of BPAI, district courts, and Court of
Federal Claims); see also Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in
Patent Litigation: The Time is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 175, 207 (2001) (noting statistics claiming Federal Circuit changes claim
construction in approximately 40% of cases); Moore, supra note 13, at 4 (explaining
empirical results suggesting district courts make reversible claim constructions one-third
of time).
19 See Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 62 (arguing that Federal Circuit in Markman
instructed trial courts to rely on intrinsic evidence for claim construction but did not offer
direction as to the function of extrinsic evidence in that capacity); see also Romary &
Michelsohn, supra note 4, at 1896 (stating that Markman made court's reliance on
extrinsic evidence entirely discretionary); Lawrence M. Sung, Echoes of Scientific Truth in
the Halls of Justice: The Standards of Review Applied by the United States Court of
Appeal for the Federal Circuit in Patent-Related Matters, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1233, 1260
(1999) (stating that Markman allows for extrinsic evidence to assist court's understanding
of patent but not to clarify ambiguity in claim language).
20 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
21 Id. at 1584.
22 See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1455 (maintaining that judges should use extrinsic
evidence only for aid in background knowledge, not for fact-finding); see also IGC-Med.
Advances, Inc. v. USA Instruments, Inc., 34 Fed. Appx. 715, 718, (Fed. Cir. 2002)(holding that extrinsic evidence may be used to assist in determining scope of technical
terms in claims); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (reasoning that extrinsic evidence may be used for aiding interpretation so long
as it does not conflict with intrinsic evidence).
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However, a problem persists when the judge accepts one expert's
claim construction because he or she necessarily rejects the other
expert's opinion, which adds a credibility-deciding issue into the
fray.2 3
Arguably the most prominent issue with regard to Markman
hearings has been the time during the litigation process at which
they are held.24 The timing issue remains prevalent because trial
courts have been given complete discretion as to when to hold
these hearings. 25 Without guidance from the Federal Circuit,
district courts have employed a spectrum of policies regarding
the timing of Markman hearings. 26 Such intrajurisdictional
uncertainty 27 represents precisely what the Supreme Court was
trying to prevent. Two separate districts have gone so far as to
promulgate local rules, which speak to brief content, discovery,
and hearings in claim construction proceedings. 28
23 See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1475 (Rader, J., dissenting) (reminding the majority
that district courts have complained about judging the credibility of expert witnesses in
Markman hearings); see also Lane & Pepe, supra note 9, at 69 (observing the Federal
Circuit has been careful to avoid endorsement of expert testimony evidence, since it
requires the court to make credibility determinations).
24 See Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 56 (noting that Markman decision focused only on
who should interpret claims, not when it should occur); see also Mark R. Malek, Markman
Exposed: Continuing Problems with Markman Hearings, 7 J. TECH. L. & POLY 195, 198
n.28 (2002) (observing that Supreme Court has provided no guidelines as to timing of
claim interpretation, resulting in inconsistency both within and between jurisdictions).
See generally David H. Binney & Touissaint L. Myricks, Patent Claim Interpretation After
Markman: How Have the Trial Courts Adapted?, 38 IDEA 155, 161 (1997) (commenting
on variability of timing in Markman hearings).
25 See Sofamar Danek Group, Inc. v. DePuy-Unitech, Inc., 74 F.3d 1216, 1221 (Fed.
Cir. 1996) (stating that trial courts should interpret claims when they feel they have
sufficient knowledge of the dispute claims and prior art); see also Vivid Techs., Inc. v. Am.
Sci. & Eng'g, Inc., 200 F.3d 795, 803 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (rejecting a per se rule that discovery
must precede claim construction); Lane & Pepe, supra note 10, at 63-64 (noting the only
limitation on discretion in determining timing of Markman hearing is that it must occur
in jury trials prior to jury instruction).
26 See HP Intellectual Corp. v. Sunbeam Prods., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9569, at *11
n.5 ("Markman hearing[s] may be conducted at almost any time in the legal proceeding").
See generally Binney & Myricks, supra note 24, at 161 (commenting on variability of
timing in Markman hearings); Malek, supra note 24, 198 at n.28 (observing that district
courts have received no guidelines with respect to timing of Markman hearings).
27 See Frank M. Gasparo, Note, Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc. and Its
Procedural Shock Wave: The Markman Hearing, 5 J.L. & POLY 723, 740 (1997)
(commenting that district courts have formulated different options available for when
claims can be construed); see also Lane & Pepe, supra note 8, at 63-64 (noting that timing
of claim construction has been inconsistent among district courts); Malek, supra note 24,
at 198 n.28 (observing that lack of guidelines has resulted in inconsistency both within
and between jurisdictions).
28 See PATENT L.R. 1-1 to 4-6 (2001) (United States District Court for Northern
District of California); W.D. Mich. L. Civ. R. 16.4(c)(2)(E)(1) (1998) (United States District
Court for Western District of Michigan).
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This Note will attempt to discern whether the Federal Circuit
has given any indication as to a preferred timing of Markman
hearings. Part II reviews the potential times that trial court
judges may conduct Markman hearings within the litigation
framework. Part III will review recent decisions of the Federal
Circuit, specifically focusing on the Federal Circuit's comments
on the respective district court's procedure and timing for claim
construction. Part IV concludes by collating the aforementioned
decisions in an attempt to discover if the Federal Circuit has any
intentions of guiding the district courts. This Note concludes
that, while most courts have conducted Markman hearings at
summary judgment, the availability of complete discretion allows
uncertainty to develop, which is contrary to Supreme Court's goal
of intrajurisdictional certainty. Complete discretion at the
district court level has lead neither to efficient resolution nor
increased settlements-instead, it has further mired the complex
arena of patent litigation.
II. POTENTIAL TIMES FOR MARKMAN HEARINGS
The issue of claim construction is central in patent
infringement litigation;29 thus, the time at which the claims are
construed can be incorporated into each party's strategy.30 From
the court's viewpoint, Markman hearings should make the
litigation process more efficient, temporally and monetarily. 31
Additionally, the court views Markman hearings in conjunction
29 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 384 ("The two elements of a simple patent case [are]
construing the patent and determining whether infringement occurred").
30 See Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 59-60 (suggesting that an effect of Markman will
be increased summary judgment motions predicated on claim construction and
infringement); see also Lane & Pepe, supra note 8, at 65 (arguing that parties place more
emphasis on getting claim construction by Federal Circuit rather than on trial court's
ruling). But see Christopher J. Harnett et al., Analysis Courts Placing Increasing Reliance
on Public Notice Function of Intrinsic Evidence, 3 PAT. STRATEGY & MGMT. 1 (2002)
(contending that Markman hearing is most significant time in litigation process).
31 See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1448, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Rader, J.,
dissenting) ("Once the parties know the meaning of the claims, they can predict with some
reliability the likelihood of a favorable judgment, factor in the economics of the
infringement, and arrive at some settlement to save the costs of litigation."); see also Lane
& Pepe, supra note 10, at 60 (observing that rationales for placing claim construction with
court was increased efficiency and predictability in patent claims). But see Moore, supra
note 13, at 31-38 (arguing that any efficiency gains are overwhelmed by district court
errors in claim construction).
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with a movement to increase the likelihood of settlement.3 2
Construing claims would assist the trial judge in immersing him-
or herself i the technological intricacies of the subject matter of
the patent.33 Presumably, the litigants would prefer not to have
the judge rush into claim construction without gaining
background knowledge regarding the technological context of the
dispute.34 The optimal time at which to conduct a Markman
hearing depends upon a weighing of the above factors: efficiency,
settlement and technology at issue.
A. Pre-discovery
The main advantages of conducting Markman hearings prior to
discovery are limiting the time and decreasing the costs
associated with a lengthy discovery process. 35 Early claim
construction will allow the parties to base their discovery on the
court's interpretation 36 and may encourage settlement 37 or
32 See Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1475 (Rader, J., dissenting) (positing that the
certainty goal of Markman was meant to promote early settlement in most patent suits).
But see Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 69-70 (suggesting that intended settlement effect of
district court claim construction has yet to materialize); Moore, supra note 13, at 28
(arguing that district court claim construction actually prolongs litigation, rather than
promotes settlement, because parties hold out for Federal Circuit review).
33 See Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., 299 F.3d 1336, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(noting that patent infringement actions are complex and litigants should assist court on
technological matters when requested to do so); see also Moore, supra note 13, at 28
(describing how judge construing claims must attempt to "step in the shoes" of person
skilled in technical field of patented invention to determine what patent language means);
Jennifer Urban, Intellectual Property: B. Patent: 1. Claim Construction: b) Extrinsic
Evidence: Bell & Howell v. Altek, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 103, 118 (1999) (observing that
accurately construing patent claims is complex process, involving understanding
underlying technology, language used to describe underlying technology, state of the art
in which claimed invention exists, and parameters of presumably unique place occupied
within field by claimed invention).
34 See Joseph B. Hosteny, Litigators Corner: Markman Redux, INTELL. PROP. TODAY
(April 2000) (remarking that claims should only be construed when court is comfortable
with its technological background), available at http://www.hosteny.comlarchive
Ihosteny%2004-00.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2004); see also Gasparo, supra note 27, at 763
(asserting that judges must "carefully ascertain the nature and operation of the allegedly
infringing device").
35 See David B. Pieper, The Appropriate Judicial Actor for Patent Interpretation: A
Commentary on the Supreme Court's Decision in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
51 ARK. L. REV. 159, 184-85 (1998) (noting technologically simple cases which depend
solely on claim interpretation are preferable for pre-discovery claim construction); see also
Malek, supra note 24, at 195 (stating Markman hearings limit discovery time); Shaw,
supra note 16, at 4 (offering low cost dispute resolution as an advantage consistent with
Supreme Court's opinion in Markman).
36 See Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 80 (claiming focused discovery is the most
important aspect of pre-discovery claim interpretation); Malek, supra note 24, at 195
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prompt adjudication. 38  Additionally, pre-discovery claim
construction will prevent litigants from offering superfluous
claim interpretation theories at trial.39
In a context outside of the litigation process, some courts have
enacted local rules for patent infringement cases. Particularly,
the Northern District of California has instituted a Claim
Construction Hearing, which is held prior to trial.40 The local
rules set forth a timeline of conferences,41 mandatory
disclosures, 42 and brief submissions 43 pertaining solely to claim
construction issues. The litigants initially decide the claim terms
that are determinative. 44 Then, each party sets forth its
(explaining claim interpretation hearings are a question of law for the judge, not a
question of fact for the jury).
37 See Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 80 (alleging early claim construction increases the
likelihood of settlement); Ellisen S. Turner, Swallowing the Apple Whole: Improper Patent
Use by Local Rule, 100 MICH. L. REV. 640, 667 (2001) (arguing narrowing the issues
strengthens the claimant's case, inducing settlement). See generally Daniel A. Crane, Exit
Payments in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic
Implications, 54 FLA. L. REV. 747, 748 (2002) (expressing present patent law encourages
settlement by promoting efficient use of resources).
38 See Luke L. Dauchot, Claim Interpretation Proceedings and Appellate Review, 1999
A.B.A. SEC. INTELL. PROP. 601, 601-1(B) (noting defendants usually wants construction
without any discovery to set up a motion for summary judgment of non-infringement);
Malek, supra note 24, at 195 (suggesting shortened discovery process leads to early
rulings on claim interpretation).
39 See Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 78 ("Discovery into various 'validity defenses and
the preparation of 'alternative' cases, depending on which interpretation is adopted, can
be deferred and perhaps avoided altogether."') (quoting David H. Binney & Toussaint L.
Myricks, Patent Claim Interpretation After Markman - How Have the Trial Courts
Adapted?, 38 IDEA 155, 162 (1997)).
40 See PATENT L.R. 2-1 (2001) (United States District Court for Northern District of
California) (requiring the parties to consider certain topics during their initial conference
pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)). See generally Gasparo, supra note 27, at 754-56
(clarifying these local patent rules supplement the Federal Rules).
41 See PATENT L.R. 2-1 (2001) (United States District Court for Northern District of
California) (stating that parties must discuss certain topics at the Case Management
Conference); see also Gasparo, supra note 27, at 754-56 (establishing rules create a rigid
time frame).
42 See PATENT L.R. 3-1 (2001) (United States District Court for Northern District of
California) (explaining information must be disclosed to each party within ten days of the
Case Management Conference). See generally Malek, supra note 24, n. 115 (stating that
mandatory disclosure efficiently provides "parties with forward view of the patent
litigation"); Gasparo, supra note 27, at 754-56 (recognizing rules require mandatory
disclosure).
43 See PATENT L.R. 4-5 (2001) (United States District Court for Northern District of
California) (presenting timeline for opening, response, and reply brief submissions). See
generally Malek, supra note 24, n. 123 (explaining parties' contentions are submitted to
court within 45 days).
44 See PATENT L.R. 3-1 (2001) (United States District Court for Northern District of
California) (clarifying party claiming infringement must set forth the claims it feels are
being infringed). See generally Malek, supra note 24, n.115 (explaining that parties must
exchange a list of terms which they believe need to be interpreted by the court); Gasparo,
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interpretation in accordance with the intrinsic evidence and any
extrinsic evidence it feels is proper.45 Finally, a hearing date is
set at which the claims are construed by the court.46 Despite the
fact that these local rules focus discovery through mandatory
disclosure and hold litigants to strict time requirements, the
Federal Circuit has not consistently upheld the Northern
District's claim constructions. 47
Only a small number of district court judges have employed
pre-discovery claim construction,48 because the disadvantages
associated with pre-discovery construction can be overcome by
interpreting the claims at a different time in the litigation
process. 49 Without any discovery, judges are forced to analyze the
claim language in a vacuum, before they know which terms will
be critical.50 Also, after only a short time for discovery, one claim
term may be dispositive of the entire issue, thus making the pre-
discovery claim construction of many terms a waste of precious
time. 51 Furthermore, if the claimant is alleging infringement
supra note 27, at 754-56 (commenting that this procedure effectively allows judges to
construe claims as a matter of law).
45 See PATENT L.R. 4-2 (2001) (United States District Court for Northern District of
California) ("[parties] shall also provide a preliminary identification of extrinsic evidence,
including without limitation, dictionary definitions, citations to learned treatises and
prior art, and testimony of percipient and expert witnesses"). See generally Malek, supra
note 24, n.115 (arguing parties submitting their own interpretations of terms effectively
reduces costs associated with discovery).
46 See PATENT L.R. 4-6 (2001) (United States District Court for Northern District of
California) (noting hearing is necessary to extent litigants believe it to be).
47 See, e.g., Budde v. Harley-Davidson, Inc., 250 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(holding Northern District erroneously interpreted a means-plus-function limitation). But
see MSM Invs. Co. v. Carolwood Corp., 259 F.3d 1335, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (affirming
Northern District's grant of summary judgment to defendant based on proper claim
construction in view of the specification). See generally Andrew T. Zidel, Patent Claim
Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study Showing the Need for Clear Guidance From the
Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 730 (2003) (asserting local rules set
timelines for management of suit, but judge may change deadlines based on specific
facts).
48 See Dauchot, supra note 38, at 601-1(E) (noting 7.8% of judges surveyed conducted
claim construction proceedings prior to discovery).
49 See Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 85-86 (claiming optimal time for claim
construction is upon summary judgment motion); Shaw, supra note 16, at 10-11
(contending post discovery, pre-trial claim construction corrects the problems prevalent if
done pre-discovery).
50 See Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 80 (explaining pre-discovery construction
negatively affects litigants because they do not have a clear picture of the litigation);
Shaw, supra note 16, at 6 (recalling judges may be uncomfortable interpreting claims
outside the case context).
51 See Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 80 (pointing out one claim term may be
dispositive of an entire case); Shaw, supra note 16, at 7 (recognizing litigants may change
strategies or new terms may become important as the case progresses).
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under the doctrine of equivalents, full discovery may be needed to
resolve the case. 52
B. Summary Judgment
A majority of courts conduct Markman hearings after discovery
but before trial.53 Pre-trial claim construction allows the parties
to focus their trial strategies on the claim interpretations handed
down by the court. 54 More specifically, courts are conducting
Markman hearings upon motion for summary judgment.5 5 The
notion of construing claims in the context of summary judgment
originated in the Federal Circuit's opinion in Markman, when the
majority stated that an understanding of the claim language
"may also be done in the context of dispositive motions such as
those seeking judgment as a matter of law."56 One benefit of
claim construction at summary judgment is that some of the
disputed claims may not be relevant to the motion, while others
will be dispositive. 57 Similarly, upon summary judgment the
litigants will have focused their efforts on the claims they feel are
52 See Shaw, supra note 16, at 5 (reassessing the Federal Circuit's decision in EMI
Group N.A., Inc. v. Intel Corp., 157 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1998), in which full discovery was
needed because of a non-infringement motion under the doctrine of equivalents). See
generally Lane & Pepe, supra note 10, at 64-66 (discussing problems with a pre-discovery
Markman hearing); Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 78-81 (discussing pre-discovery
Markman hearings).
53 See Dauchot, supra note 38, at 601-1(E) (ascertaining that 57.8% of judges
surveyed interpreted claims after discovery but before trial); Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at
73 (stating that most courts conduct a Markman hearing prior to trial). See generally
Lane & Pepe, supra note 10, at 64 (stating that many courts conduct the hearing after
discovery but before trial).
54 See Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Victor Co. of Japan, 911 F. Supp. 76, 79 (E.D.N.Y.
1996) (stating that a conscientious court will conduct the claim construction hearing
before trial); Gasparo, supra note 27, at 743 (noting that a Markman hearing will give the
litigants guidance and allow them to focus their attention on one claim interpretation for
trial); see also Binney & Myricks, supra note 24, at 184-85 (stating that pre-trial claim
construction allows the parties to clearly articulate their positions).
55 See, e.g., Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Eon Labs Mfg., 234 F. Supp. 2d 464 (D. Del.
2002); Schnadig Corp. v. Collezione Europe U.S.A., 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 19083, at *1
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2002).
56 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
57 See Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 83 (commenting that non-essential claims should
not be construed if unnecessary to resolve the dispute); Binney & Myricks, supra note 24,
at 161-62 (stating that early claim interpretation can lead to earlier dispositions of cases).
But see George Badenoch, Proceeding in the Gray Area After Markman, INTELL. PROP.
STRATEGIST, at 3-4 (June 1996) available at http://www.kenyon.com/pdf/23190.pdf (last
visited Feb. 2, 2004) (arguing that presentation of evidence at a Markman hearing may be
limited by the court because it wants to limit duplication of evidence that must be
presented again at trial).
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central to the case. 58 Hence, if the case proceeds to trial, the
litigants can concentrate their expert testimony on the relevant
claim language.5 9 Additionally, the court can subsume claim
construction into normal motions practice by interpreting the
claims in conjunction with summary judgment motions, which
presents an efficient, if not certain, solution.60
Another advantage of claim construction at summary judgment
is that the judge will likely have the benefit of some discovery to
provide a technical background sufficient enough to interpret the
claims consistent with one skilled in the art.61 While settlement
has been stressed as a benefit to early claim construction, that
connection has not materialized. 62 Yet another advantage arises
due to the de novo standard 63 with which claim constructions are
reviewed on appeal. 64 One commentary has noted "there is little
58 See Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 83 n.154 (noting that litigants will have had the
time and information necessary for focused claim construction upon summary judgment).
See generally Binney & Myricks, supra note 24, at 184-85 (stating that the parties will be
able to focus their arguments accordingly); Lane & Pepe, supra note 10, at 65-7
(discussing claim construction and summary judgment).
59 See Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 85 (speculating that focused expert testimony will
save time and money for parties and the court); Lane & Pepe, supra note 10, at 66-70
(discussing expert testimony generally); Shaw, supra note 16, at 10-15 (noting that pre-
trial claim construction allows focused expert testimony).
60 See Utah Med. Prods. Inc. v. Clinical Innovations Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d
1290, 1299 (D. Utah 1999) (suggesting that combining claim construction and summary
judgment is logical as a practical matter); Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 83-86 (discussing
the benefits of combining summary judgment and Markman hearing); see also Shaw,
supra note 16, at 11 (contending that a single hearing can be used to address claim
construction and summary judgment).
61 See Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 231 F.3d 859, 866 (Fed. Cir.
2000) ('Throughout the [claim] construction process, it is important to bear in mind that
the viewing glass through which the claims are construed is that of a person skilled in the
art.'); Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
("[c]onsultation of extrinsic evidence is particularly appropriate to ensure that his or her
understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is not entirely at variance with the
understanding of one skilled in the art."); see also Shaw, supra note 16, at 11-14
(discussing the importance if a judge understanding the technical aspects of the case).
62 See Shaw, supra note 16, at 13 (suggesting that there is no difference in settlement
figures between pre-discovery and summary judgment claim constructions); see also Lee
& Krug, supra note 8, at 69-71(stating that Markman has not increased settlements in
claim construction cases). But see Cybor Corp., 138 F.3d at 1475 (Rader, J., dissenting)
(stating that early Markman hearings would promote settlement).
63 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 372 (1996) (holding
that claim construction is a matter of law reviewed de novo on appeal); Lee & Krug, supra
note 9, at 67 (stating that review of claim construction is de novo). But see Lane & Pepe,
supra note 10, at 71 (suggesting that claim construction issues have "factual
underpinnings," which would suggest an appellate standard other than de novo).
64 See Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 85 (arguing that de novo review suggests that the
trial court should not construe claims any later than summary judgment); see also
Gasparo, supra note 27, at 743-46 (reasoning that the appellate process will be more
efficient if parties can appeal summary judgment and claim construction simultaneously).
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reason for a district court to hear the entirety of evidence in the
case before determining the meaning of the claim terms."65
The one prevalent disadvantage associated with post-discovery
claim construction involves the de novo review by the Federal
Circuit. 66 As some cases illustrate, the district court may grant
summary judgment based on erroneous claim interpretations; 67
thus, the parties will incur the expense of refocusing their efforts
on the new claim constructions handed down by the Federal
Circuit.
C. During/After Trial, Before Jury Instruction
The Eastern District of Pennsylvania employed a post-trial
claim construction in deciding Markman.68 A key advantage
associated with claim construction at or after trial is that the
vacuum-factor related to pre-discovery construction is essentially
gone. 69 In addition, the judge will also have a better grasp on the
technology, which will yield a better understanding of the file
history and prior art. 70 By the end of trial, a judge will have
heard all of the relevant evidence, effectively eliminating the
See generally Malek, supra note 24, at 201 n.80-81 (noting the problems with the
elimination of the de novo review).
65 Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 85.
66 See Pieper, supra note 35, at 177-78 (suggesting that the de novo appellate
standard may be troublesome). But see Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 83-6 (stating that
post-discovery is the optimal time for claim construction).
67 See, e.g., KIS, S.A. v. Foto Fantasy, Inc., No. 02-1263, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 3845,
at *1 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (vacating grant of partial summary judgment and remanding due to
erroneous claim construction by the lower court); Johansson v. Rose Displays Ltd., Inc.,
No. 96-1410, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 20520, at *1 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (vacating summary
judgment due to erroneous claim construction in the lower court). But see Moll v.
Northern Telecom, Inc., No. 96-1259, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17607, at *1 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(affirming the lower court's summary judgment ruling and claim construction).
68 See Markman, 52 F.3d at 973-74 ("While in appropriate circumstances, claims may
be interpreted as a matter of law by the court, in this case the jury was asked to and did
interpret the patent as part of reaching its finding of infringement.").
69 See Shaw, supra note 16 (explaining that before jury instruction, at close of trial,
judge will have full knowledge of all relevant information, and will know which claim
term or terms are decisive.); see also Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 71 (reflecting on the
beneficial exposure of the court to arguments and expert testimony to aid in
understanding patent terms); Gasparo, supra note 27, at 745 (referring to court's usual
election to hear expert testimony during the Markman hearing, whereby a judge can more
accurately interpret a claim).
70 See Badenoch, supra note 57, at 4 (intimating that the judge will become more
familiar with the technological aspects of the arguments as the trial progresses); Gasparo,
supra note 27, at 745 (providing that after hearing all evidence, a judge can better
understand the patent claim). See generally Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 71 (commenting
that testimony provides the court with meaning of certain terms in patent claims).
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need for a Markman hearing as a separate proceeding. 71 If
counselors argue every plausible claim interpretation, it is
doubtful that the court will want to hear scientifically tenuous
arguments from the litigants after experts have testified. 72
There are a significant number of disadvantages associated
with post-trial claim construction. One obvious weakness is the
delay the jury must endure while waiting for the court to decide
which claims are on-point and to construe those claims. 73 A
second problem exists in that the jury may have been listening to
testimony and viewing evidence with a particular claim
construction in mind, and the court may deliver a different
construction after trial. Consequently, the court may have to
reopen the proceeding to enable the jury to view evidence under
the judge's construction. 74 Finally, contrary to one of the
advantages proffered above, a late claim construction will force
parties to argue under a number of potential claim
interpretations. Multiple arguments under multiple
interpretations have the potential to evolve into a confusing,
inefficient, and overly lengthy litigation. 75
71 See Gasparo, supra note 27, at 745 (noting that the judge will be faced with the
entire record at the end of trial and will not need to receive additional evidence as to claim
construction); see also Badenoch, supra note 57, at 3 (referring to Markman hearing as
"adding a mini-trial" to an already costly litigation process). See generally Lee & Krug,
supra note 9, at 71 (referring to negative effect of separate evidentiary trial, whereby
court effectively holds two separate trials, increasing both litigation costs and scheduling
burdens on courts).
72 See Shaw, supra note 16, at 16 (suggesting that most judges will want experts, not
lawyers, to offer interpretations of claim language); see also Badenoch, supra note 57, at 3
(arguing that separate hearings for claim construction will encourage defendants "to
present a multitude of claim construction arguments, no matter how strained"); Lee &
Krug, supra note 9, at 76 (citing the possibility that post-trial claim construction may
cause litigants to either "roll the dice" on their desired claim interpretation or to set forth
alternate claim theories).
73 See Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 75-76 (implying that the evidence "loses its
freshness in [the juror's] minds."); see also Gasparo, supra note 27, at 746 (remarking that
the record for complex patent infringement cases can be voluminous).
74 See Pieper, supra note 35, at 185 (mentioning that contrasting constructions
between judge and jury will only lead to confusion and delay); see also Lee & Krug, supra
note 9, at 76 (indicating that the re-showing of evidence to the jury draws out an already
exhausting proceeding); Shaw, supra note 16, at 17-18 (commenting on the possibility of
creating bias in jurors as result of judge's claim construction).
75 See Shaw, supra note 16, at 18 (positing that a judge may not give claim
construction its due attention if he or she feels that the jurors are waiting with the
evidence fresh in their minds); see also Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 76 (suggesting that
confusion and complication can be limited by an earlier construction to focus the trial
upon). See generally Badenoch, supra note 57, at 3 (referring to the presentation of
additional evidence as creating confusion).
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III. FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S OPINION AS TO TIMING
Though the Federal Circuit has not clearly offered any
guidance with respect to the timing of Markman hearings, the
court may be impliedly acquiescing to certain times by upholding
claim constructions and taking note of the procedure employed by
the district court. However, the Federal Circuit has made no
attempt since Markman to restrict the broad discretion of the
trial courts in conducting claim construction. 76 The focus of this
article will center on two questions: (1) when did the district
court conduct its Markman hearing, and (2) what did the Federal
Circuit say about that court's claim construction.
A. Markman Hearing at Motion for Summary Judgment
In one of its first decisions in 2003, the Federal Circuit
reviewed Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.,77 which
was on appeal from the District Court for the District of
Massachusetts. 78 At the district court level, Chief Justice Young
issued an exhaustive 244-page opinion expounding upon issues of
claim construction, validity, enforceability, and infringement. 79
Chief Justice Young's opinion was thorough and informative,
especially with regard to his methodology and position on claim
construction.80
In Amgen, the district court was faced with a complex
biotechnology matter dealing with recombinant DNA techniques
76 See Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 59 (commenting that many aspects of Markman
hearings remain unsettled, such as timing); see also Badenoch, supra note 57, at 4
(concluding that since Markman various procedural concerns still require clarification).
See generally Pieper, supra note 35, at 184-87 (discussing the court's various timing
options for claim interpretation).
77 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
78 See Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 69 (D. Mass.
2001).
79 See Amgen, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 290-92 (rendering the court's holding as to each
claim of validity, enforceability, and infringement). See generally Randy Morin, Note:
Legal Update: Recent Federal Circuit Decision Concerning Erythropoetin (EPO): Amgen v.
TKT, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 490, 491-98 (highlighting the holding of Chief Justice
Young).
80 See Amgen, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 80-84 (elaborating on the method and timing of
claim construction); see also Morin, supra note 79, at 492 (commenting on Judge Young's
discretion used in conducting Markman hearing in order to assure a meticulous opinion).
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used to manufacture a synthetic form of erythropoietin,8 a
protein that initiates red-blood cell production in bone marrow.
At the onset of the litigation process, the parties were instructed
to formulate a list of mutually agreed upon experts that the court
could confer with for technical assistance.8 2 The court chose an
expert from the list and referred to him regularly, while making
every consultation of record.8 3 Near the end of discovery, Amgen,
the patent holder, moved for summary judgment.8 4 Chief Justice
Young remarked, "[a] motion for summary judgment is, of course,
an excellent vehicle to frame the essential questions of patent
claim construction."8 5 Because Amgen's motion for summary
judgment was granted on one claim but denied on all others, the
case proceeded to trial.8 6
Chief Justice Young seized the opportunity to accentuate the
particular claim construction methodology used by the court in
its Markman hearing.8 7 In view of the disparity in timing of
Markman hearings in the district courts, Chief Justice Young
stated, "I have consistently taken the procedural approach of
conducting the Markman hearing at the summary judgment
stage of litigation or at the point when discovery has closed and
trial is approaching."88 However, emphasis was placed on
conducting the Markman hearing prior to and separate from the
summary judgment proceeding.8 9  This distinction was
81 See Amgen, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 77 (noting that synthetic erythropoietin developed
by Amgen was the biggest-selling biotechnology drug ever developed, with sales exceeding
$1.2 billion in 1997).
82 See Amgen, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 78 (referring to court's usage of expert testimony).
See generally Peter J. Chassman, When Markman' Hearings Need Special Masters, NAT'L
L.J., Oct. 22, 2001, at C8 (discussing the use of experts and special masters in technically
complex patent infringement litigations).
83 See Amgen, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 78 n.3 (mentioning that the record would remain
sealed but would be available upon appellate review).
84 See id. at 78 (indicating that Amgen moved for summary judgment on the issue of
infringement).
85 Id. at 78 n.4.
86 See id. at 78 (granting summary judgment on only one claim out of five patents at
issue, thus requiring other issues to go to trial).
87 See id. at 80 (noting that courts have taken different procedural approaches when
conducting Markman hearings to analyze claims and that the judge has consistently held
them at either summary judgment stage of litigation or at point when discovery ends and
trial is near).
88 Id.
89 See id. (emphasizing importance of keeping issues in summary judgment motion
separate from trial issues to avoid unnecessarily burdening jury with additional complex
information that is unrelated to jury's fact finding function). But see Biogen v. Berlex
Labs., Inc., 318 F.3d 1132, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (upholding the district court's claim
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accentuated, because infringement, not claim interpretation,
should be decided at summary judgment. 90 Additionally, the
court stated that a claim of invalidity of the patent due to
statutory description requirements is an issue of fact for the
jury.91
As an important aside in his opinion, Chief Justice Young
challenged the Federal Circuit to place some restrictions on the
discretion given to district courts with respect to the timing of
Markman hearings. 92 A lack of procedural boundaries not only
"deprives the litigants of the benefit of consistent treatment
among districts (or even among specific judges), but also risks
descending a slippery slope toward the erosion of the role of the
fact finder in patent litigation."93 It seems that Chief Justice
Young was alluding to the goal of intrajurisdictional certainty
that the Supreme Court proffered in Markman. More notably,
the Supreme Court's goal has not been met, or even considered.
Procedurally, the Markman hearing began with pre-selected
claim terms that were critical to Amgen's motion for summary
judgment. 94 The court then heard oral argument from each party
regarding each of the selected terms. 95 Both parties supported
their claim interpretations with intrinsic evidence, specifically
relying on the specification and prosecution history.96
constructions though the Markman hearing was appropriately held in connection with
summary judgment).
90 See Amgen, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 80 (considering claim interpretation separate from
summary judgment to avoid blending issues of law with fact finding which is to be done
by the jury).
91 If the Court were to select a construction that it believed was more consistent
with the written description of the patent but contorted the language of the claim
terms in order to do so, the jury, in effect, would be preempted from making the
invalidity determination, which is within its province. See id. at 84.
92 See id. Chief Justice Young asked the Federal Circuit to issue a ruling which would
have a similar procedural effect as Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1996). See Amgen, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 80. In Vitronics, the Federal Circuit
seemingly settled the hotly debated issue of the use of extrinsic evidence in claim
interpretation. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582-83.
93 Amgen, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 80.
94 See id. at 81.
95 See id, The Court noted that each party's position with respect to claim
interpretation was typical: Amgen supporting an "ordinary meaning" approach to give
itself broad protection, and Hoechst reading limitations into the claims for narrowing
purposes. Id.
96 See id.; see also Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1470 (Fed.
Cir. 1997) (holding that use of a demo istrative exhibit to facilitate presentation at
Markman hearing is not improper evidence); Vitronics., 90 F.3d at 1583 (emphasizing how
intrinsic evidence is sufficient to resolve ambiguities in claim terms over extrinsic
evidence in patent disputes).
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Demonstrative exhibits were employed, but evidence was not
admitted. The court announced its claim constructions after each
party's presentations. 97
Amgen's motion for summary judgment was granted with
respect to one claim out of the ten construed by the court and
denied with respect to the remaining nine claims. 98 After
laboring over an infringement analysis of twelve claims in five
separate patents, the court issued its ruling.99 Both parties
appealed the ruling of the district court, but only Hoecsht
asserted that the claim constructions were erroneous.100
The Federal Circuit began its opinion by affirming in toto the
district court's claim construction.11 However, the de novo
standard of review meant that the Federal Circuit had to review
the same claim interpretations from Hoechst that were already
heard and rejected by the district court. 102 The Federal Circuit
conspicuously noted that Hoecsht "reviv[ed] the same argument
that the district court rejected below."10 3 Furthermore, the
Federal Circuit seemed to track the reasoning of the district
court closely, synthesizing the lower court's analysis into a less
voluminous record. 104 After agreeing with the district court's
claim construction, the Federal Circuit reviewed the lower court's
infringement analysis, which it ultimately vacated. 105
Noticeably absent from the Federal Circuit's opinion was a
response to Chief Justice Young's suggestion that the Federal
Circuit impose some procedural guidelines on the timing of
Markman hearings. The Federal Circuit made reference to the
Markman hearing only once, noting that it was three days
long.106 Two conclusions can be drawn from the Federal Circuit's
silence on the propositions offered by Chief Justice Young. First,
97 See Amgen, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 81.
98 See id. at 96.
99 See id. at 165-66. In the appendix to the opinion, the court provided an
infringement chart for each claim of each patent. See id. at 166.
100 See Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1320 (describing the claims of each party on appeal).
101 See id.
102 See id. at 1324 ("We consider the trial court's claim construction - a matter of law
- afresh on appellate review.").
103 Id. at 1327.
104 See id. at 1326 (agreeing with the district court that the plain meaning of the
terms should be used).
105 See id. at 1358 (summarizing what the district court should do upon remand).
106 See id. at 1320 (describing the temporal aspects of the district court proceedings).
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the Federal Circuit may have impliedly vouched for the
procedure and timing of the district court's Markman hearing.107
This implication is evidenced by the Federal Circuit's silence to
what Chief Justice Young obviously felt strongly about.
Secondly, the Federal Circuit immediately noted that the district
court's claim constructions were affirmed in toto.10 The phrase
"in toto" comes from the Latin meaning "in whole."o 9 A question
is raised as to whether the Federal Circuit affirmed solely the
claim constructions or the entire procedural method that lead to
those constructions. Regrettably, one is left only with conjecture,
because the Federal Circuit has remained tight-lipped.
B. Markman Hearing at Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
In Boehringer Ingelheim Animal Health, Inc. v. Schering-
Plough Corp.,110 the Federal Circuit reviewed an infringement
action in which claim construction occurred at a motion for a
preliminary injunction."l' The patent at issue related to a
method for developing a vaccine to cure a devastating disease for
the swine industry112  known as Porcine Reproductive
Respiratory Syndrome (PRRS).113 The fact that the disease has
multiple names 114 and no known cure alerted the district court
107 See id. (discussing the three-day Markman hearing and commending the district
court).
108 See id. (citing the district court's correct claim construction first in its ruling).
109 See BLACK'S L. DICTIONARY 369 (2nd pocket ed. 2001).
110 320 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
111 See id. at 1342-43.
112 See Boehringer Ingelheim Animal Health, Inc. v. Schering-Plough Corp., 984 F.
Supp. 239, 243 (D. N.J. 1997) (describing the serious nature of the disease); see also Paul
Armbrecht, Managing PRRS' Impact in Gilts, NAT'L HOG FARMER, (Aug. 15, 2003)
(stating PRRS is a major health concern), available at http://nationalhogfarmer.com
/ar/farming.managing.prrsimpact/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2004). See generally Kit
Miniclier, Pig Farms Get New Owners: Focus Facilities Shut Down to Eliminate Virus,
DENVER POST, July 29, 2002, at C-01 (describing the effects of PRRS).
113 See Boehringer, 984 F. Supp. at 243 (quoting from a letter to swine industry
professionals, calling PRRS "the most challenging infectious disease facing the swine
industry today"); see also Armbrecht, supra note 112 (stating PRRS is a major health
concern). See generally Maria Hand, Bringing Home the Bacon may be Restricted, PRESS
(CHRISTCHURCH), Aug. 23, 2001, at 4 (describing PRRS as a horrendous disease and the
most significant disease in pigs in recent years).
114 See Boehringer, 984 F. Supp. at 243 (referring to PRRS as Mystery Swine Disease
and Swine Infertility and Respiratory Syndrome); see also Miniclier, supra note 112
(acknowledging Mystery Pig Disease as another name for PRRS).
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that the principles of virology involved in the case would be
extremely complex. 115
At the onset of litigation, Boehringer moved for a preliminary
injunction to stop Schering-Plough from selling a PRRS swine
vaccine that was allegedly manufactured according to
Boehringer's patented method.116  To obtain a preliminary
injunction, the patentee alleging infringement must establish a
likelihood of success on the merits. 117 The district court stated,
"[iln a preliminary injunction context, a court may, in exercising
its discretion, decide to interpret the claim conclusively."118 The
district court held its Markman hearing in concurrence with the
preliminary injunction hearing. 19
In the beginning of the district court's opinion, Judge
Ackerman mentioned the procedure employed for holding a
Markman hearing in connection with a preliminary injunction
hearing.120 Prior to the hearing, each party submitted briefs
arguing claim constructions and the merits of a preliminary
injunction.121 After trial, Judge Ackerman asked the parties for
their findings of fact, conclusions of law, and assessments of their
adversary's position.122 The judge then asked for one final
submission from each party regarding the definition of a term,
115 See Boehringer, 984 F. Supp. at 243 (reciting basic principles of virology used by
the court for a low-level understanding of the methodology in the patent); see also
Armbrecht, supra note 112 ('There is still a lot we don't know about the PRRS virus.
Each strain appears to have different levels of virulence or ability to cause disease.").
116 See Boehringer, 984 F. Supp. at 245 (noting that Boehringer claimed literal
infringement and infringement under the doctrine of equivalents).
117 See id. (stating that success on the merits must be established for validity,
enforceability, and infringement); see also Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 867,
869 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting the standard for obtaining preliminary injunction); Pretty
Punch Shoppettes, Inc. v. Hauk, 844 F.2d 782, 783 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (describing four
factors for consideration in issuing a preliminary injunction, including the probability
that the movant will succeed on the merits).
118 Boehringer, 984 F. Supp. at 245.
119 See id. (considering claim construction "in conjunction" with the motion for a
preliminary injunction). But see Amgen, 126 F. Supp. 2d at 80 (proposing that courts
should hold Markman hearings prior to and separate from motions for summary
judgment or preliminary injunctions).
120 See Boehringer, 984 F. Supp. at 243 n.1 (noting that the Markman hearing was
eight days long).
121 See id. (suggesting that the Markman hearing may have been decided solely on a
paper record).
122 See id. (remarking that the pre-hearing and post-trial briefs would be cited in the
opinion).
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and whether the term could be used for the obviousness
analysis.123
The district court's opinion contained a brief summary of the
court's views on how Markman hearings should proceed.124 The
court seemed more concerned with the use of intrinsic and
extrinsic evidence than with the time at which a Markman
hearing should be held. The claim language was analyzed
beginning with the "ordinary meaning," followed by the
specification, and ending with the prosecution history.125 The
court reasoned that if the intrinsic evidence unambiguously
provides a term's meaning, then contradictory extrinsic evidence
should not be heard. 126 However, extrinsic evidence in the form
of technical treatises and dictionaries could be relied upon to
provide the judge with a better understanding of the
technology. 127
The district court's opinion cited the parties' briefs extensively
in the portion regarding claim construction. 128 While it is evident
that there was expert testimony and evidence was admitted into
the record, it seems that the court construed the claims primarily
from the briefs. There is no indication in the opinion that the
district court heard oral argument at the Markman hearing.
Given judges increasing familiarity with the procedure of claim
123 See id. (signifying that the court needed further information regarding a claim
term for its infringement analysis).
124 See id. at 246 (reciting claim construction procedure in a relatively brief segment
of the opinion).
125 See id. (reviewing the use of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence in a Markman
hearing).
126 See id. ('There exists one small exception to the rule disfavoring extrinsic
evidence: a court may consult technical treatises and dictionaries"); see also Peter H.
Kang & Kristin A. Snyder, A Practitioner's Approach to Strategic Enforcement and
Analysis of Business Method Patents in the Post-State Street Era, 40 IDEA 267, 295
(2000) (stressing that unambiguous intrinsic evidence cannot be contradicted by any
extrinsic evidence); Jennifer Urban, Bill & Howell v. Altek, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 103,
116 (1999) (noting that reliance on expert testimony as extrinsic evidence to contradict
unambiguous intrinsic evidence was in error).
127 See Boehringer, 984 F. Supp. at 246 (emphasizing that extrinsic evidence may not
be used if it contradicts the meaning of the term as expressed in the public file); see also
Kenneth R. Adamo, et. al., Area Summaries: Survey Of The Federal Circuit's Patent Law
Decisions In 2000: Y2k In Review, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1435, 1578 (2001) (noting the trend
that the Federal Circuit treats dictionaries as extrinsic evidence). But see Texas Digital
Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193, 1202-03 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that
dictionaries and technical treatises are not extrinsic evidence).
128 See Boehringer, 984 F. Supp. at 247-53 (observing the numerous references to
briefs, findings of fact, and conclusions of law of the parties).
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construction, some commentators have been prompted to endorse
the exclusive use of a paper record in Markman hearings.129
On appeal, the Federal Circuit reviewed the three construed
claim terms de novo.130 Affirming the district court's construction
of two of the claim terms, the Federal Circuit noted that each of
the court's constructions were at a middle-ground between the
parties' interpretations.131 The Federal Circuit determined that
the third claim term was erroneously interpreted by the district
court, because a limiting term was wrongly interposed into the
claim.132 However, the Federal Circuit noted that the district
court's incorrect construction of the third term was harmless
because the jury found that the claim was infringed under the
doctrine of equivalents.133 An interesting statement by the
Federal Circuit appeared at the end of its review of the district
court's claim construction, when it referred to the district court's
procedure as "thorough and skillful management of the case."134
However, without further explanation, a question similar to that
in Amgen remains: whether the Federal Circuit is noting the
procedure and timing of the Markman hearing to endorse them.
C. Markman Hearing at the Onset of Litigation
The Central Division of the District Court of Utah held a
Markman hearing at the initiation of litigation in Altiris, Inc. v.
129 See Charles Shiftley, Markman: Hearings Required, Or Not? (Dec. 1, 1998)
(contending that familiarity with claim construction will lead to Markman hearings based
more on paper records and less on oral argument), at http://www.bannerwitcoff.com
/articles/markman.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2004). See generally John F. Duffy, Patent
Law And Policy Symposium: Re-Engineering Patent Law: The Challenge Of New
Technologies: Part I: Administrative Law Issues: On Improving The Legal Process Of
Claim Interpretation: Administrative Alternatives, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 109, 123
(2000) (noting that Federal Circuit judges have become more familiar with "highly
technical" claim drafting); Andrew T. Zidel, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial
Courts: A Study Showing the Need for Clear Guidance From The Federal Circuit, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 711, 746 n.283 (2003) (suggesting that district courts are currently
"quite familiar with the analytical rules of claim construction").
130 See Boehringer, 320 F.3d at 1344 (mentioning the de novo standard of review for
claim construction).
131 See id. at 1347 ("We conclude that the district court again correctly chose the
middle ground between the parties' contentions").
132 See id. at 1349 (observing that the district court introduced a limiting word into
the claim to make its interpretation consistent with the embodiments in the patent).
133 See id. at 1350 (noting that even though the claim was narrowed by the district
court's construction the jury still found infringement).
134 Id.
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Symantec Corp.135 The subject matter of Altiris's patent was a
fairly sophisticated area of computer network administration.136
The court noted that two independent claims were central to the
action, even though the patent incorporated a total of twelve
claims.137 Written submissions were required regarding each
party's claim construction138 and oral arguments were heard, as
well. 139
The court began its discussion by setting forth the availability
of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence in a Markman hearing.140
Throughout the Markman hearing, the court seemed intent on
relying solely on the intrinsic evidence to construe the claim
terms. 141  However, during the Markman hearing, Altiris
requested that the court use computer industry dictionaries to
assist it in defining the claim terms, 142 because the terms were
commonly known in the industry.143 The court rejected Altiris's
plea, and decided that though the terms "may be commonly
understood in the computer industry,"144 they would be subject to
construction by the court. 145 For one claim phrase in particular,
the court found that it was uncommon to the industry and should
135 160 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (D. Utah 2001).
136 See id. at 1278-79 (reviewing procedure that computer uses to boot).
137 See id. at 1279 (reciting independent claims and dependent claims of each).
138 See id. at 1278 (mentioning that each written submission was offered only in
regards to claim construction, not infringement).
139 See id. at 1278 (noting that this opinion only concerns claim construction). See
generally Epcom Gas Sys. v. Bauer Compressors, Inc., No. 98-CV-75392, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12665, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 26, 2001) (hearing oral arguments to determine
Markman issues).
140 See Altiris, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1281 (holding order of evidence to be used is as
follows: ordinary meaning of term, specification, and prosecution history). See generally
Markman, 52 F.3d at 980 (defining extrinsic evidence as all evidence external to patent
and prosecution history, including expert and inventor testimony, dictionaries, and
learned treatises, all of which are useful in explaining scientific principles, meanings of
technical terms, and terms of art, as well as demonstrating state of prior art at time of
invention).
141 See Altiris, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1286-87 (supporting claim constructions with
specification).
142 See id. at 1285 (explaining that Altiris had combined commonly used words into
uncommon phrases). See generally Markman, 52 F.3d at 980 (defining dictionaries as part
of extrinsic evidence).
143 See Altiris, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1285 (rationalizing use of each word to form
phrases); see also Borgwarner, Inc. v. New Venture Gear, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 2d 919, 935
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (reviewing commonly known theories in one specific art).
144 Altiris, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1285 (holding that claim construction is court's
responsibility).
145 See id. at 1285 (reasoning terms were combined in uncommon ways).
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be interpreted as by one skilled in the art.146 However, the court
did not explain how it reached its construction, and it never
disclosed where the interpretation of one skilled in the art came
from.147 It seems that the court felt it had the knowledge of one
skilled in the art by construing the claim "based upon the
information and embodiment contained in the claim
specification."148 There appears to be a contradiction in the
court's procedure, because it relied exclusively on intrinsic
evidence for all the other claim constructions.
After the claims were interpreted by the district court, the
parties stipulated to Symantec's non-infringement. 149 Summary
judgment of non-infringement was granted, and Altiris appealed
to the Federal Circuit alleging that the district court erroneously
construed the claims.150 The Federal Circuit noted the de novo
standard of review, and made a point of saying that dictionaries
could be consulted to discern a term's ordinary meaning.151 Also,
the opinion noted that there is a "heavy presumption" that claims
should be viewed as by one with ordinary skill in the art.152
Furthermore, the court may use extrinsic evidence to aid in
understanding how one with ordinary skill in the art would
interpret the claim language.153
The Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in each of
its claim constructions. 154 The Federal Circuit noted that the
district court applied the right line of precedent but also
commented that, "as with much of our [Federal Circuit's] case
law on claim construction, careless application of so ambivalent a
standard can be a recipe for error."155 This statement is very
146 See id. at 1288 (concluding that uncommon phrases should be construed by one
skilled in art in view of information in specification).
147 See id. (holding claim should be interpreted by one skilled in art, and then, court
interpreted claim in subsequent sentence).
148 Id. (showing court's claim construction).
149 See Altiris, Inc. v. Syman',ec Corp., 318 F.3d 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (reviewing
exactly what parties stipulated to after Markman hearing).
150 See id. at 1368 (explaining specific challenges Altiris made on appeal).
151 See id. at 1369 (citing Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 254 F.3d 1193 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)) (explaining ordinary meaning).
152 See id. (stating that evaluation of claim language begins with the ordinary
meaning given of the terms).
153 See id. (recalling that courts may use extrinsic evidence for background knowledge
as long as it does not contradict language in the claims or specification).
154 See id. at 1378 (vacating the grant of summary judgment and remanding for
reconsideration under the newly construed claims).
155 Id. at 1369 (emphasis supplied).
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peculiar because the Federal Circuit acknowledged that district
courts are conflicted about how to apply the little precedent they
have in the area of claim construction.t 56 The court then went on
to say, "[t]he appropriate use of the rest of the specification in
claim construction has not always been clear."157 Again, the
Federal Circuit commented on the lack of confidence in
application of the law on the district court level.158
After deciding that the district court unnecessarily limited the
scope of all the disputed claims except one,159 the Federal Circuit
went on to offer its own construction.160 Altiris, again, offered to
define the terms of the uncommon phrase with a technical
dictionary.161 The Federal Circuit allowed the dictionary
definitions,16 2 and noted, "[those] particular arguments [were]
unchallenged [on] appeal."163 The district court seemed to err by
reading the claims on the preferred embodiment in the patent.
The Federal Circuit noted several times, "the description of the
preferred embodiment is not a sufficient reason to limit the
claims."164
The opinion of the Federal Circuit in this case is significant for
several reasons. First, the court took notice of the difficulty the
district court encountered in trying to apply precedent in
conducting its Markman hearing.165 Also, the lack of clarity and
guidance from the Federal Circuit was acknowledged.166 Finally,
156 See, e.g., Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1345-46 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (concluding that the district court failed to construe the claim limitations at
issue); Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(establishing that the district court's improper claim construction distorted the entire
infringement analysis).
157 Altiris, 318 F.3d at 1370.
158 See id. (noting that many claim construction principles developed by the courts
"apply with equal force").
159 See id. at 1374 (affirming the construction of one claim term, which was not
relevant to summary judgment).
160 See id. at 1373 (stating that the district court erroneously read the claim preamble
and order of the claimed steps as narrowing the scope of the claims).
161 See id. (rehearing the claim constructions from the district court provided by
Altiris).
162 See id. (agreeing with defining the claim terms with dictionary definitions).
163 Id. Symantec did not challenge the use of a dictionary to define the claim terms,
although the district court would not allow it. Id.
164 Id. at 1377.
165 See id. at 1370 (referring to the lack of clarity of applying the specification in
claim construction).
166 See id. (explaining that principles which are all afforded the same weight cannot
be applied without some difficulty).
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the Federal Circuit vacated all of the constructions issued by the
district court and had wade back through the record of the
Markman hearing to determine the correct constructions. 167 It
seems that the Federal Circuit realized that there is a problem
with consistency in the Markman hearing procedure on the
district court level. However, rather than addressing the issues
by insisting on, or even suggesting, a procedure for claim
construction, the court re-construed the claims and remanded for
consideration based on those constructions. 168 It seems as if
Altiris, Inc. v. Symantec Corp. is a perfect example of what the
Supreme Court did not want when it issued its ruling in
Markman.
D. No Markman Hearing
The Federal Circuit considered an infringement action based
on a patent for a device used to smooth the surface of freshly
poured concrete in Allen Engineering Corp. v. Bartell Industries,
Inc.169 The District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
considered, in a bench trial, many issues in a noticeably succinct
opinion. 170 As for claim construction, the district court did not
hold a Markman hearing. The court simply concluded that
Bartell infringed directly on one claim and by the doctrine of
equivalents on a second claim.171 The Court does not explain
what findings lead to this decision, only that the conclusion was
"based upon this Court's findings of fact."172
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that the district court
incorrectly construed the claims and failed to make adequate
factual findings with respect to infringement.173 The Federal
Circuit criticized the district court's method of claim
167 See id. at 1377 (holding that the district court erred in each of its attempts at
claim construction).
168 See id. (determining that the district court's grant of summary judgment should
be vacated and remanding the case for further proceedings based on the correct claim
constructions set forth by the Federal Circuit).
169 299 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
170 See Allen Eng'g Corp. v. Bartell Indus., Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 867, 872-75 (E.D. Ark.
1999) (considering infringement and validity issues, statutory bars, and Lanham Act
claims).
171 See id. at 873 (basing decision on findings of fact set forth in the opinion).
172 Id.
173 See Allen Eng'g Corp., 299 F.3d at 1342 (finding district court missed the mark
and "did not construe the claims in suit").
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construction, noting that the district court failed "in its only
attempt at claim construction" 174 and gave "little consideration to
the claim limitations."175 It seems that the district court was
mistaken in its application of the proper claim construction
procedure, although that procedure is unknown. The Federal
Circuit stated, "[t]he district court's failure to construe the claim
limitations at issue, and its inadequate factual findings on
infringement, compel this court to remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion."176 The opinion of the
Federal Circuit then listed the topics that would be at issue on
remand and indicated the proper evaluation methods the district
court should employ.177
Towards the end of the Federal Circuit's opinion, the court
asked the attorneys to remember that, along with being zealous
advocates, they are officers of the court.178 In this capacity, they
have an obligation to "assist the court in the administration of
justice, particularly in difficult cases involving complex issues of
law and technology."1 79 It appeared that the Federal Circuit
claimed that the counselors were presenting ambiguous views of
the technology to the court in efforts to undermine its claim
construction.1 8 0 Oddly, the Federal Circuit did not suggest that
the district court hold a Markman hearing to adequately
acquaint itself with the relevant technology in order to accurately
interpret the claims.
In Leoutsakos v. Coll's Hospital Pharmacy, Inc.,i8 1 a case heard
three months after Allen Engineering Corp., the Federal Circuit
was again confronted with an appeal from a district court that
did not hold a Markman hearing. Leoutsakos initiated the
infringement action in the District of New Hampshire as the
owner of a patent for an apparatus designed to help persons with
174 Id. at 1345.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 1346.
177 See id. at 1346-56 (explaining multiple issues that would be encountered upon
remand).
178 See id. at 1356 (describing counselor's obligation to client and court).
179 Id. 1356.
180 See id. at 1356-57. The Federal Circuit stated that counsel had misinformed the
district court regarding the technology and applicable precedent. Id.
181 51 Fed. Appx. 310 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
1058 ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:3
limited mobility transport themselves into and out of bed.182
After describing the evidence to be used when interpreting claim
language, the district court stated,
Claim construction often entails a Markman hearing, the
purpose of which is to provide the court with guidance on the
interpretation of complex technical information. But where,
as here, neither party has requested such a hearing, and the
subject matter of the patent is not highly technical, the
patent claims may be construed without benefit of a
Markman hearing. 183
The district court performed the claim construction with
relative ease because the patented device was akin to a support
railing on a bed.184 Summary judgment of non-infringement was
granted to the alleged infringer.185
Leoutsakos appealed, claiming that the district court
erroneously interpreted the claim language,186 or in the
alternative, that the failure to hold a Markman hearing was
reversible error.187 The Federal Circuit affirmed the claim
construction by the district court.188 With regard to Leoutsakos's
argument about the lack of a Markman hearing, the Federal
Circuit reinforced its grant of discretion to the trial court by
stating, "this court has held that a district court may approach
claim construction in any way it deems best."18 9 This statement
by the Federal Circuit suggests that the discretion granted to the
district courts regarding the timing of Markman hearings will
not be restricted-even to the point that a court need not holding
a Markman hearing if it feels that the claims can be interpreted
without one.
182 See Leoutsakos v. Coll's Hosp. Pharm., Inc., No. 00-356-M, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1868, at *2 (D. N.H. Jan. 17, 2002) (mentioning that alleged infringer made motion for
summary judgment of non-infringement).
183 Id. at *15.
184 See id. at *17 (instructing that claim terms should be given their ordinary
meaning).
185 See id. at *31 (noting that the alleged infringer's claim of invalidity was moot
because summary judgment of non-infringement was granted).
186 See Leoutsakos, 51 Fed. Appx. at 311 (explaining that Leoutsakos was arguing
erroneous interpretation of only one claim limitation).
187 See id. (pointing out that Leoutsakos's claim for a Markman hearing was a
subordinate argument).
188 See id. at 312 (stating that the district court was correct in giving the claim term
its ordinary meaning).
189 Id. (demonstrating considerable deference to the discretion of the trial court)
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E. Markman Hearings in Accordance With Promulgated Rules
The District Court for the Northern District of California has
enacted local rules for use in patent infringement cases.190 The
patent local rules apply to issues of infringement, validity, and
claim construction,191 with a claim construction hearing as the
end result.192 The Northern District employed its patent local
rules in Genentech, Inc. v. Amgen, Inc.193 Genentech brought suit
alleging that Amgen had infringed three of its patents relating to
the use of cloning vehicles for the introduction and expression of
genetic information, which does not naturally occur in the
host.194 The parties progressed through the requirements posed
by the patent local rules, and subsequently, the Northern District
issued its claim construction order.195 However, the district court
procedure contained an anomaly in that one judge, Judge Smith,
presided over the claim construction hearing, while another
judge, Judge Alsup, ruled on the motion for summary
judgment.196 The Federal Circuit opinion does not note why
different judges decided these issues, and the patent local rules of
the Northern District do not speak to this practice.197
190 See PATENT L.R. 1-2 (2001) (United States District Court for Northern District of
California) (explaining that the patent local rules apply only to infringement actions
based on utility patents). See generally Brenda Sandburg, Court May Tweak Patent Rules
With Help of Survey, RECORDER, June 9, 1999, at 7 (discussing a survey conducted to
determine how effective the rules have been); District Court Borrows Another Court's
Discovery Rules for Patent Infringement Suit, FED. DISCOVERY NEWS, July 16, 2001
(indicating the U.S. District Court for Oregon applied the patent infringement rules of the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California).
191 See PATENT L.R. 3-1 (2001) (United States District Court for Northern District of
California) (setting forth the contents of the "Disclosure of Asserted Claims and
Preliminary Infringement Contentions"). See generally Justin Beck, A Poorly Oiled
Machine, RECORDER, April 2, 2003 (asserting that a trial date is usually not set until after
a claim construction order is entered).
192 See PATENT L.R. 4-6 (2001) (United States District Court for Northern District of
California) (stating that the hearing will be conducted two weeks after the reply briefs
have been filed).
193 289 F.3d 761 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
194 See id. (reviewing the background of gene expression).
195 See id. (citing the district court's claim construction order and the relevant
interpretations).
196 See id. (revealing the multi-judge approach to deciding various different stages of
the adjudicative process).
197 See id. (lacking an explanation within the opinion as to why this particular multi-
judge approach was used).
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In the course of his consideration of summary judgment, Judge
Alsup read an additional claim limitation on to Judge Smith's
interpretation. 198 The Federal Circuit noted, "Judge Aisup's later
interpretation of Judge Smith's claim construction order.. .is
incorrect."199 The court indicated that the claim construction
order given by Judge Smith would have been affirmed on appeal,
stating "[t]his court therefore adopts Judge Smith's original
construction."200 The grant of summary judgment by Judge Alsup
was vacated, 201 and the case was remanded for an infringement
determination in accordance with the claim constructions of the
Federal Circuit, which were essentially Judge Smith's
constructions. 202
The appeal to the Federal Circuit also challenged one of the
Northern District's local rules.203 The Northern District required
each party to submit a claim chart in which each theory of
infringement claimed would be set forth.204 Here, the district
court prohibited Genentech from proceeding under a certain
theory of infringement because the theory was not listed in its
claim chart.205 The Federal Circuit upheld the ruling of the
district court and reasoned that "unlike the liberal policy for
amending pleadings, the philosophy behind amending claim
charts under Rule 16-9 is decidedly conservative and designed to
198 See id. (explaining Judge Alsup's narrowing interpretation of Judge Smith's claim
construction order).
199 Id. (indicating Judge Rader of the Third Circuit concluded that Judge Alsup's
review of Judge Smith's claim construction order was erroneous).
200 Id. (stating that Judge Smith's original construction of the claim construction
order was proper).
201 See id. (vacating for the reason of erroneous claim construction).
202 See id. (stating that to determine where Judge Alsup had incorrectly added
limitations to properly construed claims, the Federal Circuit had to look back through
Judge Alsup's constructions to Judge Smith's claim construction).
203 See id. at 31 (reviewing local patent rules); see also PATENT L.R. 16-9 (2001)
(United States District Court for Northern District of California) (requiring claim charts
be submitted by each party).
204 See Genentech, 289 F.3d at 31 (proceeding according to the local rules in patent
infringement actions); see also PATENT L.R. 16-9 (2001) (United States District Court for
Northern District of California) (mandating that claim charts identify each claim of any
patent in suit which is alleged to be infringed). See generally L.G. Elecs., Inc., v. Q-Lity
Computer, Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 360, 367 (2002) (explaining policy
behind PATENT L.R. 16-9 as requiring parties to crystallize their theories early and adhere
to them throughout the case).
205 See Genentech, 289 F.3d at 29 (stating that "[p]atentee may amend its claim chart:
(1) on stipulation of the parties; (2) upon a showing of excusable subsequent discovery of
new information; or (3) upon a showing of clearly excusable neglect.").
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prevent the 'shifting sands' approach to claim construction."206
Clearly, the Northern District wished to prevent parties from
arguing infringement under questionable claim constructions.
The Federal Circuit also noted that it "defers to the district court
when interpreting and enforcing local rules so as not to frustrate
local attempts to manage patent cases."20 7
The Northern District of California has taken efforts to add an
amount of certainty to the process of claim construction by
promulgating rules to deal with such. However, Genentech
points out a flaw in those rules. The certainty added to the claim
construction procedure by the briefs, claim charts, conferences,
and hearings is dashed when another judge must preside over
the ensuing motion for summary judgment. The Federal Circuit
noted that Judge Smith's claim construction was correct. 208
Judge Alsup did not have the benefit of a claim construction
proceeding to familiarize himself with the complex subject matter
and parties' arguments over claim interpretation. 209 Thus, for the
claim construction order to make sense, Judge Alsup read in
additional limitations and ruled on motion for summary
judgment. 210 A subsequent judge adding limitations to a claim
construction order is certainly not what the Northern District
had in mind when it enacted the patent local rules.
IV. DISCRETION.. .THE ROOT OF UNCERTAINTY
The recent opinions of the Federal Circuit regarding claim
construction and the timing of Markman hearings have, if
nothing else, reinforced one principle: district courts will have
complete discretion on how, when and if, they will conduct
206 See Genentech, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 8065, at *30-31 (quoting Atmel Corp. v.
Info. Storage Devices, Inc., CA-3:98-CV-1069-H, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17654, at *2 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 5, 1998)).
207 Genentech, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 8065, at *31 (discussing guidelines for
reviewing district court's exercise of discretion).
208 See id. at *21 n.2 (rejecting Amgen's interpretation of the Summary Judgment
Order because Judge Alsup imposed a unnecessary limitation on the claim interpretations
of Judge Smith).
209 See id. (noting that Judge Alsup made certain assumptions regarding the claim
constructions).
210 See id. (relating why this court could not accept Amgen's interpretation of the
Summary Judgment Order).
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Markman hearings. 211 In one opinion, the Federal Circuit
referred to its own line of precedent concerning claim
construction as "ambivalent."212 Then, in another opinion, the
Federal Circuit did not respond to a district court judge's plea for
some guidance with respect to the procedure that lower courts
should use in conducting Markman hearings. 213 Finally, in
separate opinions, the Federal Circuit ruled that the district
court does not have to conduct a Markman hearing at all. 214
From the analysis performed in this Note, it is apparent that
district courts should conduct Markman hearings in accordance
with standard motion practice. Commentators have advocated
that Markman hearings conducted on motions for summary
judgment or preliminary injunction would be the most effective
use of the court's and the parties' time and money.215 It is
senseless to construe claims after trial because the parties may
have argued infringement based on incorrect claim
interpretations. Thus, when the case comes back from the
appellate court, the parties must reengineer their strategy based
on new claim constructions. Additionally, patent infringement
actions that do not incorporate Markman hearings seem
unproductive. Should the technology of the patent be relatively
simple, a court would be better off carrying out a Markman
hearing, if solely for the purpose of getting more familiar with
the claim interpretation process. Uncomplicated subject matter
will also provide for a quicker claim construction process because
the need for extrinsic evidence will lessen. Also, parties may
stipulate to infringement based on the Markman order,
211 See e.g., Thomson S.A. v. Quixote Corp., 166 F.3d 1172, 1174 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(accepting district court rulings regarding Markman hearing); Flores v. Union Pac. R.R.,
No. 474, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 31117, at *2 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 1996) (considering district
court rulings and parties' submissions regarding Markman hearings).
212 See supra notes 135-155 and accompanying text.
213 See supra notes 77-109 and accompanying text.
214 See J.G. Peta, Inc., v. Club Protector, Inc., 65 Fed. Appx. 724, 727 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(expressing that district courts are not required to follow any particular procedure in
conducting claim construction); see also Firegear, Inc. v. Morning Pride Mfg., Inc., 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 14812, at *4 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that there is no legal requirement
that the Markman hearing be held prior to trial).
215 See Lane & Pepe, supra note 10, at 63 (arguing that combined hearings held in
the context of formal motions for summary judgment or for preliminary injunctions allow
judges to "construe the claims in the context of the ultimate factual issue of infringement
disputed by the parties"); see also Lee & Krug, supra note 9, at 57 (stating that optimal
time for claim construction hearing is after discovery but before trial, specifically
concordant with summary judgment motions).
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eliminating the need for a trial. 216 Finally, in the districts that
have enacted local rules for claim construction, the Federal
Circuit may want to devote a portion of a future opinion to an
analysis of the procedure employed by the rules.
V. CONCLUSION
The Patent Litigation Committee of the American Intellectual
Property Law Association will soon be issuing its 'Markman
White Paper.' Expectantly, the paper will set forth a
recommended procedure for district courts to follow in conducting
Markman hearings. Almost certainly, the paper will include a
review of any Federal Circuit opinion that has shed light on the
subject. An analysis of methods employed by different courts will
surely be incorporated, as will, more importantly, what the
Federal Circuit said on appeal about the claim constructions.
In Markman, the Supreme Court stated, "we see the
importance of uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an
independent reason to allocate all issues of construction to the
court."217 The ruling in Markman was intended to create
regularity in the patent litigation arena, which combines complex
legal issues and complicated technology subject matter. The
Supreme Court's goal has not come to fruition, and relatively
little guidance has been offered. Since Markman, the district
courts have been stumbling in the dark, awaiting the Federal
Circuit to show them the light.
216 See Kimberly Ruch-Alegant, Markman: In Light of De Novo Review, Parties to
Patent Infringement Litigation Should Consider ADR Option, 16 TEMP. ENVTL. L. &
TECH. J. 307, 308 (1998) (arguing that Markman encourages the use of alternative
dispute resolution and saves parties time and money); see also James Bradley, Issue
Preclusion as Applied to Claim Interpretation, 10 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 323, 335 (2002)
(describing how some courts have occasionally applied collateral estoppel to parties
stipulations and consent decrees). See generally Gwendolyn Dawson, Matchmaking in the
Realm of Patents: A Call for the Marriage of Patent Theory and Claim Construction
Procedure, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1257, 1270 (2001) (iterating that the use of Markman hearings
'lead naturally to early settlements, reduced litigation costs, and increased judicial
efficiency").
217 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996).

